Recent PostsCTN Issue: December 2016 Thomas Hazlett & Michael Honig, The Price of Freedom: How to Charge for Spectrum as WiFi and Cellular Collide IEEE ComSoc Technology News (Dec. 2016) Al[...]Thomas Hazlett recently reviewed two new volumes on the Information Economy for the International Journal of Economics of Business. Both Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, [...]My new research shows that more Internet access funding doesn't help students. And almost all U.S. schools are already online. By Thomas Hazlett 08/23/16 09:27 AM EDT Even during[...]How an early telephone silencer took on AT&T. By Lauren Young via Atlas Obscura It's not unusual today to overhear strangers' intimate phone conversations while comm[...]
Optimal Spectrum Allocation, CIDE, Mexico City
Presentation at CIDE, Mexico City. Mobile nets are immensely productive; no other wireless application close; opportunity cost of liberal licenses ~ $0; spectrum for liberal licenses highly valuable; more competition; more capacity (with or without extra nets); consumer gains swamp auction revenues; restricting spectrum a welfare loser; delays, reserve prices, bidder credits, etc. Total U.S.A. License Auction Revs: authorized 1993, began July 1994; 1994 – 2005: $45.1 billion bid; 1994 – 2005: only ~ $20 billion paid; bidding credits to defaults (PCS C, F); Sept. 2006 (AWS): $13.7 billion; Mar. 2008 (700 MHz): $19.4 billion; ~ $53 billion total, 1994-2008. As of 2006, Value/MHz = $150 mil.; U.S. mobile market allocated ~ 190 MHz; Imputed national value between: $28.5 billion – AWS ($13.7B/90MHz in 2006); $71.0 billion – 700 MHz ($19.4B/52 MHz in 2008); Consumer surplus easily exceeds $150 billion annually (see 2006 data).
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