Recent PostsCTN Issue: December 2016 Thomas Hazlett & Michael Honig, The Price of Freedom: How to Charge for Spectrum as WiFi and Cellular Collide IEEE ComSoc Technology News (Dec. 2016) Al[...]Thomas Hazlett recently reviewed two new volumes on the Information Economy for the International Journal of Economics of Business. Both Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, [...]My new research shows that more Internet access funding doesn't help students. And almost all U.S. schools are already online. By Thomas Hazlett 08/23/16 09:27 AM EDT Even during[...]How an early telephone silencer took on AT&T. By Lauren Young via Atlas Obscura It's not unusual today to overhear strangers' intimate phone conversations while comm[...]
Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(3), 697–751(Sept. 2008). J. Greg Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, Hal J. Singer, Criterion Economics (currently President, Empiris, LLC).
Can the standard merger analysis of the Department of Justice’s and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines accommodate mergers in high-technology industries? In its April 2007 report to Congress, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) answered that question in the affirmative. Still, some antitrust lawyers and economists advocate exceptions to the rules for particular transactions. In the proposed XM–Sirius merger, for example, proponents argue that the Merger Guidelines be relaxed to accommodate their transaction because satellite radio is a nascent, high-technology industry characterized by “dynamic demand.”