Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger

Awesomize4
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(3), 697–751(Sept. 2008).  J. Greg Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, Hal J. Singer, Criterion Economics (currently President, Empiris, LLC).

Can the standard merger analysis of the Department of Justice’s and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines accommodate mergers in high-technology industries? In its April 2007 report to Congress, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) answered that question in the affirmative. Still, some antitrust lawyers and economists advocate exceptions to the rules for particular transactions. In the proposed XM–Sirius merger, for example, proponents argue that the Merger Guidelines be relaxed to accommodate their transaction because satellite radio is a nascent, high-technology industry characterized by “dynamic demand.”

 

Related posts:

Read previous post:
Conf_DSC_0436_medium
Articles from the Merger Analysis in High Technology Markets Conference

The Information Economy Project is proud to present articles that have been published in the Journal of Competition Law &...

Close