Antitrust in Orbit: Some Dynamics of Horizontal Merger Analysis in General and with Respect to XM-Sirius

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Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(3), 753–773 (Sept. 2008). Thomas W. Hazlett, Director, Information Economy Project and Professor of Law & Economics, George Mason University School of Law.

“Horizontal merger evaluation is heavily reliant on market definition. An SSNIP framework formats the analysis, and demand elasticity evidence used to apply the test is often sparse, as is often found in high-technology industries. This paper examines other sources of evidence that reveal the dynamics of market structure, data that are also probative in the evaluation of competitive effects. These sources include capital valuations of firms, financial event studies, and the public positions taken with respect to the merger by interested parties. Such evidence is examined in the XM–Sirius merger (2007–08) and shown—in two of the three instances—to be relatively informative in merger welfare analysis.”

 

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Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(3), 697–751(Sept. 2008).  J. Greg Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics, Hal J. Singer, Criterion Economics...

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