Horizontal Mergers Among IP Licensors and IP Licensees

Luncheon Keynote Presentation to the Merger Analysis in High-Tech Markets Conference, 2008.  Luke M. Froeb, William Oehmig Associate Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University.

Joint Work: Mike Shor, Steven Tschantz. Disclaimer: Exploratory Analysis. Outline: Motivation: merger analysis. Question 1: Are horizontal merger effects affected by upstream/downstream vertical relationships? Question 2: What Happens when you ignore upstream and/or downstream vertical relationships?  Related Work: Upstream Mergers & Downstream Monopolist. Monopoly retail sector can (i) amplify, (ii) attenuate, (iii) block, or (iv) pass through upstream merger price effects, depending on the vertical contract. Froeb, Luke, Steven Tschantz, and Gregory Werden, Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers, The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johann Stennek (Eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, (2006). O’Brien, Daniel P., and Greg Shaffer, “Bargaining, Bundling, and Clout: The Portfolio Effects of Horizontal Mergers,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3) (Autumn 2005), 573–95.

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