Vernon Smith, David Porter: FCC License Auctions: Lessons from a Tumultuous Twelve Years, A Conversation with Vernon Smith and David Porter


A Lecture by Vernon Smith, David Porter

Tuesday, May 2, 2006, Arlington, Virginia

George Mason University School of Law, Room 120

4 PM Reception to Follow

The Information Economy Project is delighted to launch its speakers’ series, “Big Ideas about Information,” on Tuesday, May 2. This series, featuring world-class thinkers addressing key questions about markets, public policy, and information technology, debuts with an address by two scholars who have made seminal contributions to experimental economics.

Vernon Smith, Professor of Economics & Law at George Mason University and 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and David Porter, Professor, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University, are internationally renowned experts on the structure of auctions. Having been involved in the design and implementation of the competitive bidding mechanisms used by the Federal Communications Commission to award wireless licenses since 1994, there is much to learn from their assessment of how license auctions have worked, how they might be improved, and how they have impacted the allocation of radio spectrum rights.

Related Articles:

David Porter and Vernon Smith, FCC License Experiment Design: A 12-Year Experiment, 3 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 63-80 (2006)

Download (PDF, Unknown)

Download (PDF, Unknown)



Series NavigationBrian Lamb: C-SPAN Present at the Revolution >>

Related posts:

This entry is part 1 of 20 in the series Tullock Lecture Big Ideas About Information Series

Read previous post:
Financial Times: Neutering the Net, Thomas Hazlett

The legendary Vint Cerf, co-creator of the Internet Protocol (IP) standard in the 1970s, is pleading for “network neutrality.” Cerf,...