Tag Archives: David Teece

Video Coverage of The Digital Inventor: How Entrepreneurs Compete on Platforms

58757970108434533_hzQHFUft_f

8:45 AM  Welcoming Remarks
Daniel Polsby, Dean, George Mason University School of Law
Thomas Hazlett, Prof. of Law & Economics, George Mason University

9:00 AM  Breakfast Keynote
Design, Institutions, and the Evolution of Platforms
Richard Langlois, University of Connecticut

9:30 AM  Platforms, Modularity, and Complementary Goods
Moderator: Joshua Wright, George Mason University School of Law
Andrei Hagiu, Harvard Business School, Multi-Sided Platforms
Salil Mehra, Temple University Beasley School of Law, Platforms, Teamwork and Creativity: Mediating Hierarchs in the New Economy

10:30 AM  Industry Keynote:
Donald Rosenberg, Qualcomm, Inc., Intellectual Property and Platform Development

11:00 AM  Patent Litigation: Software Patents, Licensing, and Mobile OS Platforms
Moderator: Adam Mossoff, George Mason University School of Law
Anne Layne-Farrar, Compass-Lexecon, The Brothers Grimm Book of Business Models: A Survey of Literature and Developments in Patent Acquisition and Litigation
James Bessen, Boston University School of Law, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation

12:00 PM  Luncheon Keynote
David Teece, Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley, Why “Walled Gardens” Isn’t Inconsistent with Open Innovation: Understanding How Ecosystems “Management” Promotes Progress

This entry is part 2 of 3 in the series Digital Inventor Conference 2012

Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems

Awesomize15

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-50.  Thomas W. Hazlett, Professor of Law & Economics, George Mason University School of Law, David Teece, Thomas W. Tusher Professor in Global Business, UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, Leonard Waverman, Dean of the Haskayne School of Business at the University of Calgary.

Dynamic competitive forces are dramatically altering mobile markets in the U.S. and around the world. Wireless networks, having sunk considerable capital in the creation of phone systems, must not only compete among themselves for subscribers, but also need to form strategic alliances with emerging handset application platforms (HAPs) created by such firms as Research in Motion (Blackberry), Apple (iPhone), and Google (Android). Current developments illustrate two fundamental aspects of innovation. First, that innovations created by one set of investors may generate returns for complementary suppliers, either via coordinated activity (strategic platforms) or competitive rivalry (appropriation). Second, that the efficiency of such ecosystems may be enhanced by market structure innovations that either extend vertical control or delimit it. This runs counter to the prevailing popular and regulatory sentiment that “open” platforms offer categorically superior welfare outcomes than do “closed” systems – aka “walled gardens.” Full text available on SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963427.


SSRN Download