Research by IEP scholars Thomas Hazlett, Roberto Munoz and Diego Avanzini is now central to the debate over spectrum allocation in Thailand. A dissenting regulator, objecting to delays in the auction of 3G licenses, has used this research to estimate social losses from lack of spectrum availability. Incredibly, she is now being sued for libel by her agency.
Diego Avanzini has a Ph.D. in Economics from Catholic University of Chile, where he also teaches Econometric Methods. He studied Business Administration and Accountancy in Argentina, where he also made its M.A. in Economics. He has worked as an auditor at Auditoria General de la Nación (Argentina) and UNDP, as a research assistant at UN-ECLAC, and as a business consultant. His research interests are, Quantitative and Applied Economics (Econometrics), Regulation and Industrial Organization, and Inequality and Income Distribution.
Ph.D., Catholic University, Santiago, Chile.
10 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 93 (2012). Thomas W. Hazlett, Professor of Law & Economics, George Mason University School of Law, Roberto E. Muñoz, Senior Fellow, Information Economy Project and Professor, Federico, Santa María Technical University, Santiago, Chile, Diego Avanzini, Visiting Scholar, Information Economy Project.
Wireless license auctions have successfully replaced “beauty contests” in many countries. Competitive bidding (1) puts spectrum rights in the hands of the most productive firms; (2) reduces rent-seeking costs; and (3) captures license values for the public, potentially reducing costly tax distortions. Economists and policy makers have asymmetrically focused on (3). Yet, the overwhelming consumer welfare gains are produced in output (retail services) markets, not by extracting revenues from the sale of spectrum inputs. This fact leads to powerful policy implications, supporting liberal policies that permit market rivals to (quickly) access abundant bandwidth. Full Text Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961225.