Tag Archives: Thomas Hazlett

Time for the Supremes to Decide ‘Net Neutrality’

rcm_logo_followTime for the Supremes to Decide ‘Net Neutrality’

By Thomas Hazlett & Joshua Wright

The FCC’s dramatic 2015 pivot on Internet regulation sought to envelope advanced broadband networks in the shroud of telephone company rules rolled out in the Mann Elkins Act of 1910. These historic common carriage “Title II” regulations – originally the province of the Interstate Commerce Commission, long ago antiquated and finally abolished in 1995 — were cited as exemplars by the Commission in last year’s Open Internet Order.

Hazlett Participates in FCC’s Open Internet Roundtable

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MULTICHANNEL NEWS

Wheeler: Net May Be at Regulatory Inflection Point
Asks Whether ‘Terminating Monopolies’ Hold Key To Letting Startups Scale Up

10/02/2014
By John Eggerton

FCC chairman Tom Wheeler has at least raised the possibility that the Internet economy is at an “inflection point” at which the government needs to step in to insure the continuing ability of innovative startups to scale up at the pace of high-speed broadband.

Hazlett on The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum in the 1934 Communications Act

Hazlett-The-Rationality

On the 80th anniversary of the Communications Act, the November 2014 issue of The Review of Industrial Organization looks back at the landmark legislation and ahead to the future of broadcast regulation. The journal features an article by Thomas W. Hazlett, “The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum in the 1934 Communications Act.”

Thomas W. Hazlett,
H.H. Macaulay Endowed Professor of Economics
Clemson University

Review of Industrial Organization
Volume 45, Issue 3 (November 2014), 203-220
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Published on-line: August 27, 2014

Hazlett’s paper is available here:

Download PDF (367 KB)

Here is the abstract:

Abstract

The Federal Radio Commission regulated radio broadcasting, 1927–1934. With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the 1927 Radio Act (enabling the Commission) was re-enacted in whole. This congressional endorsement yields key evidence as to what policy outcomes were intended, differentiating competing theories for the origins of spectrum allocation law: Coase (J Law Econ 2(1):1–40, 1959), emphasizing policy error; Hazlett (J Law Econ 33:133–175, 1990), focusing on “franchise rents” in a public choice framework; and the “public interest” hypothesis, reconstructed by Moss and Fein (J Policy Hist 15(4):389–416, 2003). Congress’ revealed preferences prove consistent with the franchise rents theory, while contradicting the other two.